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The Circulation of Judgments Under the Draft Hague
Judgments Convention
Ronald A. Brand *
Abstract
The 2018 draft of a Hague Judgments Convention adopts a
framework based largely on what some have referred to as “jurisdictional
filters.” Article 5(1) provides a list of thirteen authorized bases of indirect
jurisdiction by which a foreign judgment is first tested. If one of these
jurisdictional filters is satisfied, the resulting judgment is presumptively
entitled to circulate under the convention, subject to a set of grounds for
non-recognition that generally are consistent with existing practice in most
legal systems. This basic architecture of the Convention has been assumed
to be set from the start of the Special Commission process, and will be key
to the Convention’s acceptability to countries which might ratify or accede
to any final Convention. An alternative approach to convention
architecture, which would allow the test for judgment circulation to be built
on as few as four rules, was considered and passed over in the earlier
Working Group which preceded the Special Commission process. This
article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each of the 2018 draft
Convention text as well as the alternative approach. It then suggests that, no
matter which approach one considers to be better, the 2019 Diplomatic
Conference should begin with an awareness of both options, and an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of each, and move
forward with a clear decision that the option chosen is the best alternative.
Such consideration may (1) lead to the conclusion that the choices already
made are the best for a multilateral treaty; (2) result in a determination that
an alternative approach is a better option; or (3) demonstrate that one
*

Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor, John E. Murray
Scholar, and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. The author was a member of the U.S. delegation to the
Judgments Project negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private International
Law in both the Working Group and the Special Commissions prior to the May
2018 Special Commission and has participated in numerous conferences
concerning the Hague Judgments Project. The statements in this article are those of
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reflect the position of the United States in the negotiations. The author thanks Peter
Trooboff for useful comments on a prior draft.
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approach works best for some legal systems while another approach works
best for other legal systems – leading to dual texts that could form the bases
for differing bilateral and multilateral treaty relationships across the globe,
while still improving the global framework for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments has been the
subject of multilateral negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law since 1992, when the United States requested that a
global approach to jurisdiction and judgments recognition be placed on the
negotiating agenda. 1 With the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements now in effect in Mexico, Singapore and the 28 countries of the
European Union, 2 a second Judgments Project has moved through the
Special Commission stage at the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. 3 The May 2018 draft text of a Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters will be
considered at a Diplomatic Conference in summer 2019. 4 That draft text
creates a framework based largely on what some have referred to as
“jurisdictional filters.” Article 5(1) provides a list of thirteen authorized
bases of indirect jurisdiction by which a foreign judgment is first tested. If
one of these jurisdictional filters is satisfied, the resulting judgment is
presumptively entitled to circulate under the convention, 5 subject to a set of
grounds for non-recognition that generally are consistent with existing
practice in most legal systems. 6
1

The discussion of judgments recognition at the Hague Conference actually
began much earlier with a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters completed in 1971, but never entering
into effect. See RONALD A. BRAND & PAUL M. HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE
CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS ch. 1 (Cambridge University
Press 2008).
2

Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/specialised-sections/choice-of-court.
3

See Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Judgments
Project, https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments.
4
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special Commission on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 2018 Draft
Convention, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/9faf15e1-9c36-4e57-8d5612a7d895faac.pdf.
See
also
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislativeprojects/judgments/22nd-diplomatic-session.
5

Id. art. 5(1).

6

Id. art. 7.
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There are a number of important decisions to be made by the 2019
Diplomatic Conference. These include: (1) whether judgments on
intellectual property rights will be included within the scope of the
Convention, and, if so, how they will be dealt with; (2) whether any
Convention provision will address the question of mutual trust, either by
allowing differing bilateral relationships or requiring that any new
Contracting State receives the benefits of the Convention in all other
Contracting States; and (3) the relationship of the Convention with other
international instruments. These issues have received attention, both in
commentary and in the draft Explanatory Report on the Convention text. 7 A
matter that has not received as much attention, but nonetheless is of key
importance deals with the basic architecture of the Convention; i.e., how the
Convention identifies which foreign judgments are entitled to recognition
and enforcement. That architecture will significantly influence the treaty’s
acceptability to the Member States and other countries that might ratify or
accede to the final text. The May 2018 draft text represents one approach to
convention architecture by establishing the basic test for circulation of a
foreign judgment through a complex set of thirteen jurisdictional filters.
The building of the Convention text around that choice is significant, but
has received limited comment.
An alternative approach to convention architecture, which would
allow the test for judgment circulation to be built on as few as four rules,
was considered and passed over in the earlier Working Group. 8 The first
three rules in such an alternative would state simple “fairness” tests,
binding a judgment debtor to (1) decisions of the judgment debtor’s home
court; (2) decisions of the court in which the judgment debtor initiated the
action; and (3) decisions of a court to which the judgment debtor expressly
consented to jurisdiction. These three bases of jurisdiction reflect the
common elements of general jurisdiction throughout the world as a result of
the plaintiff’s territorial home, and party consent. They are for the most part
non-controversial in comparative jurisdictional jurisprudence. They provide
7

See, e.g., Mayela Celis, HCCH Revised Draft Explanatory Report (version
of December 2018) on the Judgments Convention is available on the HCCH
http://conflictoflaws.net/2019/hcch-revised-draftwebsite
(Jan. 20,
2019),
explanatory-report-version-of-december-2018-on-the-judgments-convention-isavailable-on-the-hcch-website/.
8

The author was a member of the Working Group.
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respect for jurisdiction based on the choice of the party against whom a
judgment may be recognized and enforced.
The fourth rule in the alternative approach to convention architecture
would replace ten of the thirteen jurisdictional filters in Article 5(1) with a
single rule that would provide the indirect jurisdiction test for what is
commonly referred to as special or specific jurisdiction. Rather than
attempting to define all of the possible acceptable bases of indirect
jurisdiction for the life of the Convention, such a provision would state a
simple rule of non-discrimination. If the court addressed would have
allowed personal jurisdiction over the defendant on the facts existing in the
court of origin (i.e., if jurisdiction would have existed under direct
jurisdiction rules of the state of the court addressed based on the existing
facts as determined by the court of origin), then the court addressed must
acknowledge the legitimacy of the basis of jurisdiction in the court of origin
and honor the resulting judgment. In other words, a Contracting State’s
rules of indirect jurisdiction, for determining recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments, would be the same as that States rules of direct
jurisdiction for determining whether to take the case as the originating
court. Each Contracting State would thus be compelled to acknowledge, as
to its partner Contracting States, that, if a rule of jurisdiction is found to be
acceptable at home, it must be found to be acceptable in other Contracting
States.
The May 2018 draft text list of jurisdictional filters offers apparent
advantages in that it provides an exhaustive list of available indirect bases
of jurisdiction, creates predictability in international litigation by having the
list available when a case is initiated, and conforms (in part) to the
predominant legal system model – continental European civil law. 9
Nonetheless, it also carries with it several disadvantages.
There are at least five potential disadvantages of the architecture of
the current draft Convention. They are:

9

The core instrument in that system is the Brussels I Recast Regulation.
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I Recast Regulation), [2012]
O.J.E.U. L 351/1, 20 December 2012.
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1)

the risk of an exhaustive list which locks in what may become
outdated tests that can be changed only by difficult treaty
amendment;

2)

the risk of diminishing predictability through national court
interpretation and the attendant “homeward trend” that has been
evident in similar conventions which provide “uniform” rules;

3)

the risk of assuming that effective national or regional legal
frameworks can automatically be implemented on a global
scale;

4)

the risk of retention and endorsement of discriminatory
jurisdictional schemes applied to judgments recognition rules,
thus avoiding normal international trade treaty concepts of
reciprocity: and

5)

the risk of a diminished channeling function that might
otherwise be achieved under a system that encourages
uniformity of direct and indirect bases of jurisdiction; i.e., the
Convention will not encourage either private parties to alter
their litigation conduct or States to reconsider the continuation
of exorbitant bases of direct jurisdiction.

No matter which alternative convention architecture one considers to
be a better approach, the 2019 Diplomatic Conference should begin with an
awareness of the available options and an understanding of the advantages
and disadvantages of each, and move forward with a clear decision that the
option chosen is the best alternative. Such consideration may lead to the
conclusion that the choices already made are the best for a multilateral
treaty. It may result in a determination that an approach other than that in
the May 2018 Draft Convention Text now appears to be a better option. Or
it may demonstrate that one approach works best for some legal systems
while another approach works best for other legal systems – leading to dual
texts that could form the bases for differing bilateral and multilateral treaty
relationships across the globe, while still improving the global framework
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE HAGUE JUDGMENTS PROJECT

In May of 1992, the United States proposed that the Hague
Conference on Private International Law consider preparing a multilateral

8
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convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments. 10 The matter
was placed on the agenda of the Hague Conference in October 1996, 11
resulting in a Preliminary Draft Convention text in October 1999. 12 That
text was revised again at the first part of a split Diplomatic Conference in
June 2001. While a new text was created, closely following the 1999 Text,
problems with completion were clear from its many bracketed provisions,
footnotes, and explanations of various positions. 13 In April 2002, the
Conference instructed an informal working group to consider drafting a
more limited convention, including only those jurisdictional provisions on
which substantial consensus existed. This resulted in a March 2003 Draft
Text on Choice of Court Agreements. 14 A further Special Commission
considered that text, and the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
was concluded at a Diplomatic Conference in June of 2005. 15

10

Letter of May 5, 1992 from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S.
Department of State, to Georges Droz, Secretary General, The Hague Conference
on Private International Law, distributed with Hague Conference document L.c.
ON No. 15 (92).
11

Final Act of the Eighteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 19 October 1996, at 21.
12

Informational note on the work of the informal meetings held since
October 1999 to consider and develop drafts on outstanding items, drawn up by the
Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No
15 (May 2001) (containing the text of the Preliminary Draft Convention).
13

Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission II,
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Summary of
the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic
Conference 6-20 June 2001, Interim Text.
14

Preliminary Result of the Work of the Informal Working Group on the
Judgments Project, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No
8 (Mar. 2003) (corrected) for the attention of the Special Commission of April
2003 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference.
15

The text of the Final Act of the Twentieth Session, and a documentary
history of the Choice of Court Convention project, are available on the Hague
Conference website at: http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&ci
d=98.
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The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements went into
effect for Mexico and the European Union (for 27 of its Member States) on
October 1, 2015; 16 for Singapore on October 1, 2016; for Montenegro on
August 1, 2018, and for Denmark on September 1, 2018. 17 The People’s
Republic of China, Ukraine, and the United States have signed, but have
not ratified, the Convention. 18
The Choice of Court Convention contains three basic rules: Article 5
provides that a court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall
have exclusive jurisdiction; Article 6 provides that a court not chosen shall
defer to the chosen court; and Article 8 provides that the courts of all
contracting states shall recognize and enforce judgments from a court
chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement, subject to an explicit list
of bases for non-recognition found in Article 9. 19 Thus, the 2005
Convention is both a jurisdiction convention (limited to one basis of
jurisdiction: consent to exclusive dispute settlement in the courts of one
state) and a judgments convention (providing for circulation of judgments
from cases based on exclusive choice of court agreements).
In October 2011, the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the
Hague Conference established an Experts’ Group to consider the
resumption of the Judgments Project. 20 There was a desire on the part of
some delegations to return to the original project and again draft a
convention that would deal with both direct jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments. In 2012, the Council split these two
objectives when it established a Working Group to prepare proposals for a
judgments convention and directed the Experts’ Group to give further study

16

On December 28, 2018, the United Kingdom filed an instrument accepting
the Convention should its withdrawal from the European Union become effective
in March 2019. See HCCH, Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=
conventions.status&cid=98.
17

Id.

18

Id.

19
For a more complete discussion of the Choice of Court Convention, see
BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 1.
20

See HCCH, The Judgments Project,
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments.
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to a separate jurisdiction convention. 21 The Working Group completed a
Proposed Draft Text of a judgments convention in 2016, and the Council
established a Special Commission to move the text forward. The Experts’
Group was instructed to move forward on a jurisdiction convention only
after the judgments convention text would be concluded. 22 Special
Commission meetings for a Judgments Convention were held on June 1-9,
2016; February 16-24, 2017; November 13-17, 2017; and May 24-29, 2018.
It is anticipated that a Diplomatic Conference will be held in late June and
early July of 2019. 23
III. THE MAY 2018 DRAFT TEXT FOR A CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL MATTERS
A.

The General Framework

The basic structure of the May 2018 Draft Judgments Convention
Text is rather simple, but is then made more complex through the set of
indirect jurisdiction filters by which a court is to determine whether a
judgment may circulate under the Convention. Articles 1-3 set forth the
scope of the Convention and provide definitions. 24 The Convention applies
to “the recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to civil or
commercial matters,” subject to the exclusions from scope found in Article
2. The scope provisions generally follow those in the 2005 Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, except that the Judgments
Convention does not exclude consumer matters from scope.
Article 4(1) provides the operative rule of the Convention, which
requires that each Contracting State recognize and enforce judgments from
other Contracting States and permits refusal only on those grounds
expressly set out in the Convention. The text reads as follows:

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

The May 2018 Draft Text of a Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (reproducing the text
set out in Working Document No 262 REV) is
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/23b6dac3-7900-49f3-9a94-aa0ffbe0d0dd.pdf.
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[a] judgment given by a court of a Contracting State (State of
origin) shall be recognised and enforced in another Contracting
State (requested State) in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter. Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on
the grounds specified in this Convention.
Article 5 then determines which judgments are “eligible for
recognition and enforcement” under the convention by providing a list of
bases of jurisdiction on which a judgment may have been founded. Thus,
the court addressed for purposes of recognition and enforcement indirectly
considers the basis of jurisdiction on which the court of origin directly
founded its judgment. Each item on the list is effectively adopted as an
indirect basis of jurisdiction for purposes of the Convention text. 25 If the
court of origin could have satisfied any one of the jurisdictional tests in the
Article 5(1) list, then the judgment is presumptively qualified for
recognition and enforcement under the Convention.
Not all of the tests in the Article 5(1) list may necessarily be described
as “bases of jurisdiction.” For example, the tests in subparagraphs 5(1)(a)
(court of defendant’s habitual residence), 5(1)(c) (party which brought the
principal claim), and 5(1)(e) (party consent), can be described as simple
fairness tests by which it can be determined that it is appropriate for the
courts of other states to give effect to the resulting judgment. These tests
may also be described as rules of comity based in public international law
considerations, namely, when should a public body (a court) in one country
not interfere with, and instead contribute to making effective, the
relationship between a public act (a judgment of a court of another country)
and the parties affected by that act.
Article 6 inserts a limited number of direct jurisdiction rules into the
judgments convention by providing that in specific instances exclusive
jurisdiction exists only in the courts of a single state, and that – in the case
of judgments concerning such situations – only judgments from the courts
25
In the terminology thus used to describe the provisions of Article 5(1), a
“direct basis of jurisdiction” is a basis applied in the court of origin, in which the
original judgment is rendered. An “indirect basis of jurisdiction” is a basis used by
the court addressed when it is asked to grant recognition and enforcement. In this
way, bases of indirect jurisdiction are used by the court addressed to test the
jurisdiction of the court of origin in order to determine the qualification of the
judgment for recognition and enforcement in the court addressed.
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of that state may be recognized and enforced under the Convention. This
also effectively provides a rule requiring non-recognition – a judgment
from a state other than that with exclusive jurisdiction may not be
recognized. Article 7 provides the general bases for non-recognition of a
judgment, even if that judgment meets the requirements of Article 5. This
list tracks closely the grounds for non-recognition found in the 2005 Hague
Choice of Court Convention, 26 which grounds are generally familiar in
national law throughout the world and include such concerns as fraud, lack
of proper notice, the existence of inconsistent other judgments, and
inconsistency with the public policy of the recognizing state.
Articles 8-17 provide additional rules governing specific
circumstances and procedures in an action for recognition and enforcement
of a judgment. Articles 18-26 are the “general clauses” for purposes of
operation of the Convention. Articles 27-34 are the “final clauses” dealing
with ratification, etc.
Articles 4-7 thus contain the basic rules by which judgments will be
tested for purposes of recognition and enforcement under the Convention.
Of these, if a judgment is within the scope of the Convention under Articles
1 and 2, Article 5(1) then determines the judgments which are eligible for
recognition and Article 7 then sets out the bases on which recognition may
be denied, even for a judgment otherwise qualified under Article 5. This
makes Article 5(1) the door through which a judgment must pass in order to
be considered for recognition under the Convention.
B.

The Article 5(1) Threshold for Judgment Circulation Under the
Convention

Because of its fundamental role in the Convention architecture,
Article 5(1) is likely to be of central concern to any state’s determination of
whether to ratify the Convention. Thus, the advantages and disadvantages
of the Article 5(1) list of jurisdictional filters deserves careful consideration
in reaching a final Convention text. In some ways, this provision represents
an effort to provide the equivalent of a comprehensive domestic recognition
and enforcement statute in an international convention. This is similar to
what occurred in the original jurisdiction and judgments project and was
found in the 1999 and 2001 texts. When that approach failed to generate a

26

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 9.
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workable text, negotiators sought a different approach, resulting in the 2005
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The problems in the 1999 and
2001 draft texts of a comprehensive jurisdiction and judgments convention
went far beyond over-drafting, and largely existed because of bracketed text
and footnotes indicating both uncertainty and failure of substantive
agreement (and, in fact, strong disagreement over the policy and drafting of
those provisions). It may be that the two situations are different at this stage
of the negotiations, in that the May 2018 Draft Text does not represent the
same level of disagreement over policy. Nonetheless, there is similar reason
for concern for over-drafting, and it is worth taking a step back and asking
whether the May 2018 Article 5(1) text is likely to lead to a Convention that
can either achieve broad ratification or be effective if widely ratified.
In order to consider carefully the impact of the May 2018 draft of
Article 5(1), it is necessary to consider the length and complexity of its
terms, which read as follows:
Article 5
Bases for recognition and enforcement
1.
A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if
one of the following requirements is met –
(a) the person against whom recognition or enforcement
is sought was habitually resident in the State of origin at
the time that person became a party to the proceedings in
the court of origin;
(b) the natural person against whom recognition or
enforcement is sought had his or her principal place of
business in the State of origin at the time that person
became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin
and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of
the activities of that business;
(c) the person against whom recognition or enforcement
is sought is the person that brought the claim, other than a
counterclaim, on which the judgment is based;
(d) the defendant maintained a branch, agency, or other
establishment without separate legal personality in the
State of origin at the time that person became a party to
the proceedings in the court of origin, and the claim on
which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of
that branch, agency, or establishment;

14
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(e) the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction
of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings in
which the judgment was given;
(f) the defendant argued on the merits before the court
of origin without contesting jurisdiction within the
timeframe provided in the law of the State of origin,
unless it is evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to
the exercise of jurisdiction would not have succeeded
under that law;
(g) the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation and it
was given in the State in which performance of that
obligation took place, or should have taken place, in
accordance with
(i)

the parties’ agreement, or

(ii) the law applicable to the contract, in the
absence of an agreed place of performance,
unless the defendant’s activities in relation to the
transaction clearly did not constitute a purposeful and
substantial connection to that State;
(h) the judgment ruled on a tenancy of immovable
property and it was given in the State in which the
property is situated;
(i) the judgment ruled against the defendant on a
contractual obligation secured by a right in rem in
immovable property located in the State of origin, if the
contractual claim was brought together with a claim
against the same defendant relating to that right in rem;
(j) the judgment ruled on a non-contractual obligation
arising from death, physical injury, damage to or loss of
tangible property, and the act or omission directly causing
such harm occurred in the State of origin, irrespective of
where that harm occurred;
(k) the judgment concerns the validity, construction,
effects, administration or variation of a trust created
voluntarily and evidenced in writing, and –

RONALD A. BRAND
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(i) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State
of origin was designated in the trust instrument as a State
in which disputes about such matters are to be determined;
or
(ii) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State
of origin was expressly or impliedly designated in the trust
instrument as the State in which the principal place of
administration of the trust is situated.
This sub-paragraph only applies to judgments regarding internal
aspects of a trust between persons who are or were within the
trust relationship;
(l)

the judgment ruled on a counterclaim –

(i) to the extent that it was in favour of the
counterclaimant, provided that the counterclaim arose out
of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim;
(ii) to the extent that it was against the counterclaimant,
unless the law of the State of origin required the
counterclaim to be filed in order to avoid preclusion;
(m) the judgment was given by a court designated in an
agreement concluded or documented in writing or by any
other means of communication which renders information
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference,
other than an exclusive choice of court agreement.
For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, an “exclusive choice of
court agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or
more parties that designates, for the purpose of deciding
disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a
particular legal relationship, the courts of one State or one or
more specific courts of one State to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of any other courts. 27

27

The remainder of Article 5 has relevance for consideration of paragraph
(1), and reads as follows:
2.
If recognition or enforcement is sought against a natural person
acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a
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consumer) in matters relating to a consumer contract, or against an
employee in matters relating to the employee’s contract of
employment –
(a) paragraph 1(e) applies only if the consent was addressed to
the court, orally or in writing;
(b) paragraph 1(f), (g) and (m) do not apply.
[3. Paragraph 1 does not apply to a judgment that ruled on an
intellectual property right or an analogous right. Such a judgment is
eligible for recognition and enforcement if one of the following
requirements is met –
(a) the judgment ruled on an infringement in the State of
origin of an intellectual property right required to be granted or
registered and it was given by a court in the State in which the
grant or registration of the right concerned has taken place or,
under the terms of an international or regional instrument, is
deemed to have taken place[, unless the defendant has not acted
in that State to initiate or further the infringement, or their
activity cannot reasonably be seen as having been targeted at
that State];
(b) the judgment ruled on an infringement in the State of
origin of a copyright or related right, an unregistered trademark
or unregistered industrial design, and it was given by a court in
the State for which protection was claimed[, unless the
defendant has not acted in that State to initiate or further the
infringement, or their activity cannot reasonably be seen as
having been targeted at that State];
(c) the judgment ruled on the validity[, subsistence or
ownership] in the State of origin of a copyright or related right,
an unregistered trademark or unregistered industrial design, and
it was given by a court in the State for which protection was
claimed.]
The brackets around paragraph 3 indicate that the question of the inclusion of
intellectual property right (IP) cases within the scope of the Convention is yet to be
determined, and this portion of the text remains for further consideration. The
problems with IP cases was recently demonstrated in SAS Institute, Inc. v. World
Programming Limited, 874 Fed. 3d 370 (4th Cir. 2017) (denying recognition to a
UK judgment finding a click wrap agreement prohibiting reverse engineering and

RONALD A. BRAND
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR ARTICLE 5(1)
As noted earlier, an alternative approach to Article 5(1) was
considered, but not followed, in the Working Group which prepared a draft
text for consideration by the Special Commission. The following is an
example of how such an alternative approach might look (with the first
three tests being quite similar to those found in Article 5(1)(a), (c), and (e)
of the May 2018 draft Convention text):
Article 5
Bases for recognition and enforcement
1.
A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if
one of the following requirements is met –
a)

the person against whom recognition or enforcement is
sought was habitually resident in the State of origin at
the time that person became a party to the proceedings
in the court of origin;

b) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is
sought is the person that brought the claim on which the
judgment is based;
c) the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction of
the court of origin either prior to or in the course of the
proceedings in which the judgment was given; or
d) the dispute in the State of origin was based on facts which
would have satisfied a basis of direct jurisdiction
available in the State addressed.
This approach would provide for a much simpler Convention architecture,
and in that sense is similar to the widely successful New York Arbitration
Convention. It also has the virtue of consistency with the approach taken in
many Hague Conference Member States. The advantages and
disadvantages of each alternative, and whether the four-point alternative
approach would be a better Convention architecture, are discussed below.

use for production purposes to be invalid under UK law, on the ground that North
Carolina public policy favors the enforcement of contracts).
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V.

A.

ASSESSING THE ALTERNATIVES

Advantages of the May 2018 Article 5(1) Text

At the outset, like any other legal text, Article 5(1) presents factors
that may be categorized as both advantages and disadvantages, depending
on the purpose one is seeking to achieve. Thus, some of the factors listed as
possible advantages in this section will also be discussed as possible
disadvantages in the following section.
1.

A comprehensive and exhaustive set of bases of indirect
jurisdiction

Like the 1999 and 2001 texts for a comprehensive jurisdiction and
judgments convention, the May 2018 draft of Article 5(1) represents an
effort to be exhaustive. Thus, in traditional civil law fashion, the effort
largely has been to cover every possible acceptable direct jurisdiction basis
as a rule of indirect jurisdiction – i.e., as a jurisdictional filter. To the extent
being exhaustive is an advantage in a judgments convention, this is an
advantage of the Article 5(1) text. It leaves fewer possibilities for judicial
consideration outside the Convention’s application. By allowing the
recognition and enforcement of judgments beyond those covered by the
Convention (except for judgments in violation of the direct jurisdiction rule
of Article 6), the Convention presents a floor for judgments recognition
purposes, and not a ceiling. 28 Under Article 16, courts in Contracting States
may consider granting recognition and enforcement to judgments beyond
those which may be recognized and enforced under the Convention; they
simply would not do so by applying Convention rules. 29 The Article 5(1)
list, however, by including thirteen jurisdictional tests, represents an effort
to set the floor high.
2.

Predictability through clear statement

Also like civil law code-type legal instruments, Article 5(1) has been
drafted with an eye to predictability. There are clear advantages to having
the set of all possible indirect jurisdictional bases allowed under the

28
May 2018 Draft Text, supra note 24, art. 16 (“Subject to Article 6, this
Convention does not prevent the recognition or enforcement of judgments under
national law.”).
29

Id.
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Convention expressly stated rather than acknowledged by implication, as is
otherwise possible. A lawyer bringing an action in a case that may require
recognition and enforcement in a state other than the state of the court of
origin will have a single list of indirect jurisdictional bases to consider. If
one of those bases is satisfied, then any resulting judgment would be
presumptively eligible for recognition and enforcement in all Contracting
States under the Convention.
3.

Adoption of the majority legal system model

The civil law model on which Article 5(1) is based is the predominant
model for judgments recognition law throughout the world. In the Hague
negotiations, the European Union has been a leading advocate of this
approach, and has proposed many of the provisions of Article 5(1),
understandably working to keep the set of jurisdictional filters consistent
with current EU law. Conformity with the predominant legal system model
presents obvious advantages for future Convention ratification and
operation. Because many non-European legal systems have developed from
the continental civil law model, it is necessarily the approach more
consistent with legal systems in most Hague Member States. The
Convention is more likely to be ratified by the EU as a major player in the
process, and thus more likely to draw further adherents as a result of having
an important lead ratification. As the Brexit process also demonstrates,
important common law states have adopted many aspects of the Continental
civil law model for jurisdictional rules, thus making the draft text approach
to presumptive circulation of a judgment a seemingly natural one.
B.

Disadvantages of the May 2018 Article 5(1) Text
1.

The risk of locked-in treaty text

The advantages of the exhaustive nature of Article 5(1) of the draft
Convention text also bring corresponding disadvantages. By attempting to
be exhaustive, the Article 5(1) text runs both the risk of not going far
enough, and the risk of going too far. The effort is exhaustive only with
respect to situations that have been confronted up to this point in time.
Given the dynamism of international trade – and the rapid process of
change in concepts of legal persons, methods of communication, and
technical means for the delivery of both content and services – it is not
difficult to imagine that other bases of jurisdiction may become widely
adopted, but remain outside the Convention. Nor is it difficult to imagine
that existing bases of jurisdiction may no longer fit advancing technological
methods. This approach thus risks locking in what may become outdated
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tests that can be changed only by treaty amendment – a process which is
extremely difficult, particularly when (as is otherwise desirable) there are a
large number of Contracting States.
2.

The risk of “homeward trend” interpretation

The litigation predictability generated by an exhaustive list of
jurisdictional filters also has its downside. While the Article 5(1) list may
present a lawyer considering the best forum in which to bring an
international case with the full set of indirect jurisdictional bases under the
Convention, it also brings with it greater opportunity for non-uniformity of
interpretation. Thus, while predictability is enhanced by having a fixed list,
it is also diminished by having an elaborate and complex set of “uniform”
which will be interpreted by multiple national courts. Because there is no
single final court to provide binding interpretation of the Convention text,
and because the courts of every Contracting State are likely to be subject to
the “homeward trend” prevalent in other conventions which purport to
provide “uniform” rules, 30 the more indirect rules that are included in
Article 5(1), the more likely that both predictability and uniformity of
interpretation will suffer.
In the alternative, the narrowness of each jurisdictional filter may
result in net predictability about the application of each rule, but reduced
coverage of situations relevant to the evolving world of cross-border
relationships. The alternative approach suggested above would result in the
test for judgment circulation being determined by national courts based on
their own rules of direct jurisdiction. These may evolve pragmatically to
take account of new developments. Moreover, they would be delineated and
applied by the courts of the state in which they apply, making non-uniform
interpretations of the Convention text less likely.

30
Professor John Honnold first referred to the “homeward trend” in the
interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG). Decisions from Contracting States have not been consistent
on every issue, and there have developed certain regional versions of the CISG as a
result of judicial gloss. See, e.g., Harry M. Flechtner, Another CISG Case in the
U.S. Courts: Pitfalls for the Practitioner and the Potential for Regionalized
Interpretations, 15 J.L. & COM. 127 (1995).
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The risk of assuming effective legal system transfer

While the May 2018 draft text of Article 5(1) may be predictable, and
while such an approach may work well in national or regional internal
legislation such as the Brussels I Regulation (where a single court will
provide uniform interpretation), using the same approach in a global
convention that is not easily subject to later amendment can be a source of
potential problems. While the EU has demonstrated that the Brussels I
Regulation may be updated and revised, that is not so easily accomplished
with a treaty to which many more states are parties. The very specific
nature of the language of each entry in Article 5(1) may well lock in
terminology that, over the course of time, simply will not be capable of fair
and reasonable application. What is appropriate in the law of a single
federal entity is not necessarily appropriate in a global treaty.
4.

The risk of favoring discriminatory jurisdictional schemes
over reciprocity

In the Explanatory Note setting the stage for Special Commission
consideration of the Judgments Convention draft text from the Working
Group, one of the stated goals of a judgments convention was listed as the
facilitation of international trade and investment by enhancing the free flow
of judgments. 31 In other words, this is more than a private international law
convention; it is also a trade law convention.
A fundamental rule found in just about every trade treaty is a rule of
non-discrimination. 32 Contracting States take on reciprocal obligations in
31

See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International Law, Judgments Prel.
Doc. No 2, Explanatory Note Providing Background on the Proposed Draft Text
and Identifying Outstanding Issues (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter Prel. Doc. No 2] (“The
Working Group proceeded on the basis that the future Convention is intended to
pursue two goals:
● to enhance access to justice;
● to facilitate cross-border trade and investment, by reducing costs and risks
associated with cross-border dealings.).
32

See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, opened for
signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
reprinted in IV GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 1-78 (1969), as
amended by the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Done at Marrakech, Apr. 15, 1994. See also
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order to create an international system that is fair and balanced. The May
2018 Draft Text does not include a rule of non-discrimination. Rather,
through the choice of a specific set of rules of indirect jurisdiction in Article
5(1), it allows those states which discriminate in the process of judgments
recognition to continue to do so. This results from the creation of a set of
indirect jurisdiction rules which may be more limited than a Contracting
State’s corresponding set of direct jurisdiction rules. This will allow
Member States to continue to allow the use of what are otherwise
considered to be exorbitant bases of jurisdiction against foreign defendants
in their own courts while at the same time refusing to recognize and enforce
judgments brought on the same bases in foreign courts. 33
The discriminatory jurisdiction gap problem is not a minor problem of
the existing global system on recognition of judgments, and any global
convention should address it. The May 2018 draft Convention text does not
do so. A study done for the Working Group in 2015 listed the following
countries as using the same test for direct jurisdiction as for indirect
jurisdiction, and thus having no jurisdiction gap: 34

Ronald A. Brand, New Challenges in the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments, in THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ITS CHALLENGES (F. Ferrari & Diego P. Fernandez Arroyo eds., Edward Elgar
Publishing, forthcoming 2019).
33

Such a discriminatory approach is clearly rejected in the internal EU
system for recognition and enforcement of judgments through the operation of
Article 5 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, which allows defendants domiciled in
Member States to be sued in other Member States only if one of the bases of
jurisdiction listed in Sections 2 through 7 of the Regulation exists. With the
resulting exclusive list of direct bases of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement
under Article 36 then occurs without consideration of jurisdiction in the court of
origin, thus making the bases for direct and indirect jurisdiction exactly the same
under the Regulation. Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 9.
34

Comparative Study of Jurisdictional Gaps and Their Effect on the
Judgments Project, memo of July 1, 2015 to Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, prepared by Mr. Charles Kotuby, partner
at the law firm Jones Day, Washington, DC. See also Comparative Table on
Grounds of Jurisdiction Prepared by the Permanent Bureau, January 2015.
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Albania
Argentina
Austria
Bulgaria
Canada

Chile
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland

Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Latvia
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Luxembourg
Mexico
Slovakia
United States

The same study found a jurisdiction gap in which direct bases of
jurisdiction were more extensive than were indirect bases of jurisdiction in
the following countries:
Australia
Cyprus
Denmark
Egypt
Finland

Ghana
Iceland
Indonesia
Jordan

Kazakhstan
Kenya
New Zealand
Nigeria

Norway
Sweden
UAE
United Kingdom

The absence of a jurisdiction gap can be demonstrated by the
judgments recognition systems in the United States, Germany, and Italy. In
the United States, the general rule for recognition of judgments is found
most often in state law in the form of a uniform act. 35 The 2005 Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, 36 provides that a
foreign money judgment which is final and enforceable in the country in
which it is rendered, shall be recognized and enforced, 37 subject to a limited
list of grounds for non-recognition. 38 One of the mandatory grounds for
non-recognition is that “the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.” 39 U.S. courts have uniformly interpreted this provision

35

For more complete information on the U.S. system for the recognition of
foreign judgments, see Ronald A. Brand, Federal Judicial Center International
Litigation Guide: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 74 U. PITT.
L. REV. 491 (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443977.
36

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome/librarydocuments?communitykey=ae280c30-094a-4d8f-b7228dcd614a8f3e&tab=librarydocuments.
37

Id. art. 4(a).

38

Id. art. 4(b) and (c).

39

Id. art. 4(b)(2).
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of the Uniform Act (and of the common law test without the Uniform Act)
to mean the foreign court must have had jurisdiction according to U.S. tests
of personal jurisdiction. 40 This means that, if the facts before the foreign
court would have satisfied the tests a U.S. court applies in determining
direct jurisdiction, then the U.S. court addressed for purposes of recognition
and enforcement, will accept that judgment, subject to specific listed
grounds for non-recognition. There is no difference between the test for
direct jurisdiction and the test for indirect jurisdiction.
The same is true in German courts faced with a request for
recognition and enforcement of a judgment from outside the European
Union. 41 Section 328(I) of the German Code of Civil Procedure includes a
requirement that the foreign court from which a judgment originates had
“jurisdiction under German law.” 42 In Italy, Article 64 of Law 218/1995, is
similar on this issue, requiring that, for recognition of a foreign judgment to
occur, “the authority rendering the judgement had jurisdiction pursuant to
the criteria of jurisdiction in force under Italian law.” 43 In each of these
instances, the rules of direct jurisdiction are applied as the rules of indirect
jurisdiction. This means that, so long as the case could have been brought in

40

The prevailing view is that, even if the rendering court had jurisdiction
under the laws of its own state, a court in the United States asked to
recognize a foreign judgment should scrutinize the basis for asserting
jurisdiction in the light of American concepts of jurisdiction to
adjudicate. International Shoe and its progeny govern this
determination.
RONALD A. BRAND, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS FUNDAMENTALS
ch. 6 (2d ed. 2018). See, e.g., Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 181 N.J.
Super. 105, 108, 436 A.2d 942 (App. Div. 1981) (“In determining whether the
Italian court had jurisdiction we deem it appropriate to apply the minimum contacts
test.”).
41

Judgments from within the EU are governed by the Brussels I Recast
Regulation. Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 9.
42
See I PHILIP WEEMS, ENFORCEMENT
FRG-29 (1993).
43

Article 64(1)(a) of Law 218/1995, Italy.
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the recognizing state on similar jurisdictional facts, the court addressed will
accept that jurisdiction was proper in the court of origin.
This is not the case in those countries which have a broader list for
direct jurisdiction than for indirect jurisdiction purposes. An example of
such a discriminatory jurisdiction gap is found in the United Kingdom.
There, the direct jurisdiction rules are found in Practice Direction 6B which
accompanies Part 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 of the Supreme
Court of England and Wales (CPR). The Practice Direction provides a court
with discretion to order service outside the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom in a number of specific situations. 44 The Practice Direction lists

44

Practice Direction 6:

Service out of the jurisdiction where permission is required
3.1 The claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with
the permission of the court under rule 6.36 where –
General Grounds
(1)

A claim is made for a remedy against a person domiciled within
the jurisdiction.

(2)

A claim is made for an injunction(GL) ordering the defendant to
do or refrain from doing an act within the jurisdiction.

(3)

A claim is made against a person (‘the defendant’) on whom the
claim form has been or will be served (otherwise than in reliance
on this paragraph) and –

(4)

(a)

there is between the claimant and the defendant a real
issue which it is reasonable for the court to try; and

(b)

the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another
person who is a necessary or proper party to that claim.

A claim is an additional claim under Part 20 and the person to be
served is a necessary or proper party to the claim or additional
claim.

(4A) A claim is made against the defendant in reliance on one or
more of paragraphs (2), (6) to (16), (19) or (21) and a further
claim is made against the same defendant which arises out of the
same or closely connected facts.
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Claims for interim remedies
(5)

A claim is made for an interim remedy under section 25(1) of
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.

Claims in relation to contracts
(6)

A claim is made in respect of a contract where the contract –
(a)

was made within the jurisdiction;

(b)

was made by or through an agent trading or residing
within the jurisdiction;

(c)

is governed by English law; or

(d)

contains a term to the effect that the court shall have
jurisdiction to determine any claim in respect of the
contract.

(7)

A claim is made in respect of a breach of contract committed
within the jurisdiction.

(8)

A claim is made for a declaration that no contract exists where,
if the contract was found to exist, it would comply with the
conditions set out in paragraph (6).

Claims in tort
(9)

A claim is made in tort where –
(a)

damage was sustained, or will be sustained, within the
jurisdiction; or

(b)

damage which has been or will be sustained results from
an act committed, or likely to be committed, within the
jurisdiction.

Enforcement
(10) A claim is made to enforce any judgment or arbitral award.

RONALD A. BRAND

Claims about property within the jurisdiction
(11) The subject matter of the claim relates wholly or principally to
property within the jurisdiction, provided that nothing under this
paragraph shall render justiciable the title to or the right to
possession of immovable property outside England and Wales.
Claims about trusts etc.
(12) A claim is made in respect of a trust which is created by the
operation of a statute, or by a written instrument, or created
orally and evidenced in writing, and which is governed by the
law of England and Wales.
(12A) A claim is made in respect of a trust which is created by the
operation of a statute, or by a written instrument, or created
orally and evidenced in writing, and which provides that
jurisdiction in respect of such a claim shall be conferred upon the
courts of England and Wales.
(13) A claim is made for any remedy which might be obtained in
proceedings for the administration of the estate of a person who
died domiciled within the jurisdiction or whose estate includes
assets within the jurisdiction.
(14) A probate claim or a claim for the rectification of a will.
(15) A claim is made against the defendant as constructive trustee, or
as trustee of a resulting trust, where the claim arises out of acts
committed or events occurring within the jurisdiction or relates
to assets within the jurisdiction.
(16) A claim is made for restitution where –
(a)

the defendant’s alleged liability arises out of acts
committed within the jurisdiction; or

(b)

the enrichment is obtained within the jurisdiction; or

(c)

the claim is governed by the law of England and Wales.

Claims by HM Revenue and Customs
(17) A claim is made by the Commissioners for H.M. Revenue and
Customs relating to duties or taxes against a defendant not
domiciled in Scotland or Northern Ireland.

27
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twenty-one connecting factors, each of which may justify service outside
the jurisdiction and thus constitute an acceptable basis of jurisdiction over a

Claim for costs order in favour of or against third parties
(18) A claim is made by a party to proceedings for an order that the
court exercise its power under section 51 of the Senior Courts
Act 1981 to make a costs order in favour of or against a person
who is not a party to those proceedings.
(Rule 46.2 sets out the procedure where the court is considering
whether to exercise its discretion to make a costs order in favour of or
against a non-party.)
Admiralty claims
(19) A claim is –
(a)

in the nature of salvage and any part of the services took
place within the jurisdiction; or

(b)

to enforce a claim under section 153, 154,175 or 176A of
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.

Claims under various enactments
(20) A claim is made –
(a)

under an enactment which allows proceedings to be
brought and those proceedings are not covered by any of
the other grounds referred to in this paragraph; or

(b)

under the Directive of the Council of the European
Communities dated 15 March 1976 No. 76/308/EEC,
where service is to be effected in a Member State of the
European Union.

Claims for breach of confidence or misuse of private information
(21) A claim is made for breach of confidence or misuse of private
information where
(a)

detriment was suffered, or will be suffered, within the
jurisdiction; or

(b)

detriment which has been, or will be, suffered results from
an act committed, or likely to be committed, within the
jurisdiction.
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foreign defendant. The same is not true when a UK court tests the
jurisdiction of a foreign court when a judgment is brought for recognition
and enforcement. In that latter event, UK courts apply “The Dicey Rule,”
found in the most recent edition of Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws. 45
That test provides for only four grounds of indirect jurisdiction. 46 The result
could be interpreted either as acknowledgment that the longer list of direct
bases of jurisdiction found in Practice Direction 6B contains otherwise
questionable bases of jurisdiction, or that there is a desire to discriminate
against judgments from foreign courts.
The alternative approach to Article 5(1) suggested above would
effectively prevent a jurisdiction gap by making the grounds for indirect
jurisdiction in each Contracting State exactly the same as that state’s
grounds for direct jurisdiction – for judgments coming from courts of other
Contracting States. This would mean that the rules for recognition and

45

DICEY & MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, Rule 43 (14R-054) (15th ed.
2012). See, e.g., Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2012] UKSC 46, at ¶¶ 7-10, in which
Lord Collins, the General Editor of Dicey & Morris, follows the “Dicey Test,” and
traces its history.
46

DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 45, Rule 43:

Rule 43 – Subject to Rules 44 to 46, a court of a foreign country
outside the United Kingdom has jurisdiction to give a judgment in
personam capable of enforcement or recognition as against the person
against whom it was given in the following cases:
First Case – If the person against whom the judgment was given was,
at the time the proceedings were instituted, present in the foreign
country.
Second Case – If the person against whom the judgment was given
was claimant, or counterclaimed, in the proceedings in the foreign
court.
Third Case – If the person against whom the judgment was given,
submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing in
the proceedings.
Fourth Case – If the person against whom the judgment was given,
had before the commencement of the proceedings agreed, in respect of
the subject matter of the proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of
that court or of the courts of that country.

30

THE CIRCULATION OF JUDGMENTS

enforcement in each Contracting State could differ from those in other
Contracting States, but they would be consistent with each Contracting
State’s rules for direct jurisdiction. Parties to litigation in which recognition
and enforcement may be required in other Contracting States would
logically begin by looking at the first three bases for judgment circulation in
the alternative list. This alone would create some channeling of litigation
into those three more favored approaches to jurisdiction. Beyond that,
parties to international litigation would then consider the grounds for direct
jurisdiction in the state or states in which recognition or enforcement may
be required. This final step is no different from what is currently necessary
when recognition and enforcement may be required in a country in which
there is no jurisdiction gap.
Whether one is concerned with simple fairness and preventing
discrimination, or with the normal process of reciprocity common to
international trade treaties, the fact that the May 2018 draft Judgments
Convention text would lock in discriminatory jurisdiction gaps in the states
in which they currently exist is a matter which should be considered
carefully before a final Convention text is approved.
5.

The risk of a diminished channeling function

The other goal of a Judgments Convention which was noted in the
Permanent Bureau Report to the first Special Commission is the possibility
of improving the litigation landscape through “access to justice” for parties
considering or involved in cross-border litigation. 47 Access to justice is a
judgments recognition issue, but it is first a direct jurisdiction issue. This
raises the question of how a judgments convention might impact questions
of direct jurisdiction, otherwise than by possibly setting up a later
negotiation of a jurisdiction convention.
Other than the Article 6 incorporation of specific bases of exclusive
jurisdiction, and their use to provide grounds for prohibition of recognition
even outside the Convention, the May 2018 draft Judgments Convention
text does not explicitly affect rules of direct jurisdiction. A functioning
Judgments Convention can, however, have an impact on national rules of
jurisdiction through a channeling effect which may occur even in the
absence of a separate jurisdiction convention. Litigators bringing claims

47

Prel. Doc. No 2, supra note 31.
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which may require judgment recognition in a country other than that of the
court of origin will necessarily consider the bases of direct jurisdiction
which can result in circulation of their judgment under a Convention. Their
litigation conduct will be channeled into widely accepted bases of
jurisdiction.
If a Convention is built on rules of indirect jurisdiction – as is the
May 2018 text – those rules should also be considered by litigators at the
outset, and should channel cases to courts in which acceptable bases of
jurisdiction exist for both direct and indirect jurisdiction purposes. A list of
thirteen indirect jurisdiction bases in Article 5(1) limits the possibilities of
achieving this channeling function. The list does encourage bringing cases
which satisfy one of the jurisdictional bases on the list. As noted earlier,
however, it also sets up rather complex rules that may result in different
interpretations of those jurisdictional bases in the courts of different
Contracting States – thus limiting predictability and risking non-recognition
even though the court of origin finds the jurisdictional basis to exist.
An alternative based on a simple non-discrimination rule should
encourage cases to be brought based on the direct jurisdiction rules most
common to countries in which recognition and enforcement might be
sought. Over time, this may cause Contracting States to reassess their bases
of direct jurisdiction, and serve as well to provide a channeling effect that
could result in the reduction of the number of exorbitant bases of
jurisdiction existing in those states. This may be only an indirect way of
achieving what might otherwise be done by a jurisdiction convention, but,
given the problems which prevented coalescence on rules of direct
jurisdiction in the Hague 1999 and 2001 drafts of a comprehensive
jurisdiction and judgments convention (which problems largely continue to
remain), it may be a more palatable and likely way of achieving that result.
C.

Comparing the Alternatives

The advantages of the approach found in Article 5(1) of the draft text
of May 2018 may be summarized as follows:
1)

it provides an exhaustive list of available indirect bases of
jurisdiction;

2)

it creates predictability in international litigation by having the
list available when a case is initiated; and

3)

it conforms to the predominant legal system model – that of the
continental European civil law legal system.
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In comparison to the May 2018 draft text of Article 5(1), the
alternative approach suggested above would diminish or eliminate:
1)

the risk of an exhaustive list which locks in what may become
outdated tests that can be changed only by difficult treaty
amendment;

2)

the risk of diminishing predictability through national court
interpretation and the attendant “homeward trend” that has been
evident in similar conventions which provide “uniform” rules;

3)

the risk of assuming that effective national or regional legal
frameworks can automatically be implemented on a global
basis;

4)

the risk of retention and endorsement of discriminatory
jurisdictional schemes applied to judgments recognition rules,
thus avoiding normal international trade treaty concepts of
reciprocity: and

5)

the risk of a diminished channeling function that might
otherwise be achieved under a system that encourages
uniformity of direct and indirect bases of jurisdiction.

Consistently more rapid technological developments have a
significant impact on both what is exchanged across borders and the
manner in which it is exchanged. Those developments also have an impact
on legal rules dealing with disputes which arise from those exchanges.
More-and-more, we are confronted with a borderless world in which
jurisdictional rules require reference to territorial concepts. While people
and goods could easily be identified to exist within the physical borders of
states in the nineteenth century, developments in legal personality,
intellectual property rights, financial services, and other elements of
international trade, cause both legal persons and relevant legal concepts to
exist in many places (and many states) at once, without clear deference to
state authority defined by lines drawn on maps.
Jurisdictional rules based on the place of performance of a contract or
the place of injury resulting from a tort now often require the reification of
concepts in order to treat them as if they are things that exist within
physical borders. In other words, they require reference to legal fictions.
This may simply be a matter of necessity, but, as the Member States of the
Hague Conference prepare a Judgments Convention for the future, it is
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important that the result not be a nineteenth century instrument to be used
to solve twenty-first century problems.
It may be that some of the problems discussed above can be reduced
through the operation of Article 16 of the May 2018 draft Judgments
Convention text. That provision provides that: “Subject to Article 6, this
Convention does not prevent the recognition or enforcement of judgments
under national law.”
This allows Contracting States to continue to apply rules on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments which are more liberal than those in
the Convention text. That, however, only increases the discriminatory effect
of the May 2018 draft text. Those Contracting States without a jurisdiction
gap, in which judgments beyond the May 2018 draft text rules could be
recognized and enforced as consistent with the direct jurisdiction rules in
the state addressed, would continue to give effect to foreign judgments from
other Contracting States. Those Contracting States with a jurisdiction gap
are less likely to use the freedom of Article 16 to recognize and enforce
judgments outside the Convention framework. The very basic reciprocity
expected of treaty relationships would thus be frustrated.
It may be that there is no single best text. Legal systems in some
countries may best fit the approach taken in the May 2018 draft Judgments
Convention text, while other systems may better fit an approach with the
benefits of the alternative suggested above. This is not necessarily a bad
result. It is entirely possible that movement toward greater free movement
of judgments can occur on two fronts simultaneously. For example, the
May 2018 text could move forward to a final Convention text at a
Diplomatic Conference in 2019. That text could become the source of
greater multilateral judgments recognition among countries which would
sign and ratify. At the same time, an alternative text along the lines
presented above might well draw to it countries that find the impact of the
May 2018 text to be less than ideal. Other countries might find it desirable
to become party to both types of conventions.
D.

The Difficult Political Question

One issue the May 2018 draft Judgments Convention text has not yet
fully addressed is the question sometimes referred as “mutual trust.” 48 This
48

See, e.g., Andreas Bonomi, New Challenges in the Context of Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments, in THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE
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issue was addressed in the 1971 Hague Judgments Convention by requiring
not only general ratification of the Convention text, but also separate
bilateralization of Contracting State obligations through declarations
regarding the other Contracting States to which each Contracting State
would apply the benefits of the Convention. 49 Only five countries have
ratified or acceded to that Convention, with no indication that the required
separate bilateral agreements have been reached to put the treaty into force
in an effective way between any of those Contracting States. 50
The structure of the 1971 Judgments Convention demonstrates that
countries may be hesitant to ratify a judgments convention which allows
any other country to join and automatically receive reciprocal benefits. So
far, the Hague Judgments Project has not directly faced this issue. This is
perhaps a political matter more appropriately addressed in a Diplomatic
Conference than in a Special Commission. It will, nonetheless, require
direct consideration, and the adoption of a specific treaty approach.
If the Diplomatic Conference in 2019 retains the architecture found in
the May 2018 Draft Text – and in particular if no internal system is
included in the final Convention text for dealing with the mutual trust
issue – then the alternative approach to Convention architecture suggested
above may well provide a useful text for a separate network of bilateral
judgments recognition treaties; or even for a second multilateral treaty.
Having such an alternative available to a Hague Convention text may well
result in additional, if not greater, progress toward the goal of global
circulation of civil and commercial judgments. While this approach may

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS CHALLENGES (F. Ferrari & Diego P. Fernandez
Arroyo eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2019).
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not maximize participation in a Hague Conference instrument, it could
serve Hague Conference goals, and supplement the enhanced circulation of
judgments that may result from a Hague Judgments Convention with more
limited membership.
VI. CONCLUSION
The May 2018 draft text for a Hague Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters indicates a
clear choice for an approach that carries with it a number of risks, including
a significant risk of non-uniform interpretation over the life of the treaty.
That risk results in particular from the long list of jurisdictional filters found
in Article 5(1) of the Convention. While this approach to convention
architecture may be the best approach, full consideration of an alternative
has not occurred since early in the negotiating process, when only a small
Working Group was involved and the Article 5(1) list was shorter and less
complicated. It may well be that the choices which have been made provide
the best approach to a global judgments recognition convention.
Nonetheless, failure to fully compare the current approach – as it has been
more fully developed by the Special Commission – against the alternative
which was passed over when drafting was at a much earlier stage, may not
be prudent.
Moreover, it may well prove valuable to have two judgments
convention models available for Hague Conference Member States
(whether officially through the Hague Conference system or not). Even if
the approach taken in the May 2018 draft Judgments Convention text
moves forward, some countries may find it more palatable to enter into
bilateral or multilateral judgments recognition treaties which offer an
approach that avoids some of the risks presented in the May 2018 draft text,
as well as present other benefits over the draft Hague text.

